Anglo Texas Moves Closer to Rebellion (Jun 16, 2024)
by Scott Sosebee
When Stephen F. Austin arrived back in Texas from his imprisonment in Mexico, he landed in a place that, in many ways, was unlike the one that he had left. One of the effects of the reform laws that Austin had helped to place before the Mexican Congress had divided Texas into three new administrative districts. One was Béxar, which encompassed the area around San Antonio and south to the Nueces River. The Brazos district consisted of mostly Austin’s grant areas along with the bulk of other Anglo empresario lands and Nacogdoches, the large area north of the Trinity and west of the Sabine. Coinciding with the new legislation and taking place while Austin was confined, Farías ordered Colonel Juan Nepomuceno Almonte to pick up where Mier y Terán had left off in 1829 and once again investigate the situation in Texas.
What Almonte found may have shocked the leaders in Mexico City. Traveling throughout Texas in the summer of 1834, Almonte’s report clearly showed how pervasive the Anglo influence was in Texas. He counted a population of 21,000 non-Native Americans (likely an undercount), with 4,000 of those in Béxar, 8,000 in Brazos, and more than 9,000 in Nacogdoches. Further indicating the prevalence and potential consequences of Anglo influence in the province, he found no slaves held in Béxar, while there were at least a thousand in both the other two districts. He reported that the Anglos controlled all of the political and social leadership positions in the Brazos and Nacogdoches districts and were actually establishing a presence in Béxar, although ethnic Mexicans still constituted a majority. Surprisingly, to many, was his assessment of the potential discontent in the province. He concluded that the Texians were content with the reforms that Congress had passed and that stability was the overall condition in Texas. Even Austin, out on bond in Mexico City when he became aware of Almonte’s report, agreed that the reforms had been effective and that the Texas request for separate statehood was not needed at the time. The overall mood was that perhaps the crisis had passed and that the differences had been assuaged and progress could move forward.
What such a view failed to take into account was the ambition and sheer mendacity of José Antonio López de Santa Anna. Santa Anna, who had ascended to the presidency as a Federalist champion, had strategically abandoned his position after his coup’s success. He had re-appeared at a few opportune times to keep his presence in place, but his absence had caused his Vice-President, Gómez Farías, to have to stand in the path of the brickbats and sling arrows of political battles. Farías, as a champion of Federalist liberal reforms and policies, had made powerful enemies among the elite echelons of Centralist leadership, which, naturally, led to another feature of Mexican politics to appear—opposition to the elected leadership that could lead to a coup. Santa Anna realized such a danger, and if he remained aligned with the Federalist cause, his political—and perhaps very life—could come to an end. So, Santa Anna did what his ambition usually led him to do: he “switched” sides and declared himself a Centralist.
Santa Anna grandly and boldly returned to Mexico City in April 1835, shunted Fárias aside, and once again took over the presidency. He then clearly staked out his ambition and agenda, as well as his full transformation from Federalist stalwart—one who had been somewhat of a hero to the Texians—to a Centralist authoritarian. He dissolved the existing Congress and replaced it with what was an essentially appointed one full of representatives who would “rubber stamp” his policies. He then moved to consolidate his dictatorial control over the government. He unilaterally abolished the Constitution of 1824, which had the effect of ending the sovereignty of all Mexican states. He replaced those now-defunct governments with “departments” wholly run by his cronies and supporters. His rump congress then affirmed his power by essentially turning all governmental power over to his government.
The majority of the Mexican states reacted as one would think they would, but only one would choose outright opposition and rebellion to Santa Anna’s moves, and it was not Texas. The central state of Zacatecas and its staunchly Federalist governor, Francisco García Salinas, voiced their direct resistance to Santa Anna’s policies and new government and, invoking the traditional opposition to Centralist policies under a Federalist banner, he led an army of near four thousand men against Santa Anna’s rump departmental government. Santa Anna, who realized that to either allow Zacatecas to enact a revolt or to succeed would undermine his power, personally took command of the Mexican national governmental response. He and his troops—about 4,000 strong—marched to Zacatecas City and defeated the governor’s troops in a pitched battle. Santa Anna’s victory would have cemented his power to quell revolt, but he had something else in mind. Santa Anna had been a young staff officer under General Joquín Arredondo when he marched to Texas to defeat the Republic of the North’s rebellion in 1811. Arredondo had a particular method to stop any hint of revolt against power—terror. Just as Arrendondo had executed the prisoners he had captured at the Battle of Medina, Santa Anna moved to enact the same horror on the people of Zacatecas, both as a remedy and a warning. Santa Anna allowed his troops to rape, pillage, and murder Zacatecans at will for two days after the battle. This was his warning against any state or people who may decide to challenge his rule, but one can’t help but conclude that he was perhaps specifically sending a message to the Anglos in Texas.
As the 1835 calendar moved toward fall, the Anglos in Texas were at a crossroads. The state leaders of Coahuila y Tejas in Saltillo had made little more than tepid responses to Santa Anna’s scheme of centralism and, in some policies, had certainly shown more corruption than opposition. Santa Anna, who the Texians had once hailed as a Federalist hero, was instead proving to be a Centralist nightmare. The conditions of misunderstanding, miscommunication, and social and cultural differences had created a culture of distrust between the Anglos in Texas and the ethnic Mexican majority governments in which they lived under. Santa Anna’s turn toward authoritarianism would thus prove to be the spark that would bring revolution in Texas by the fall of 1835.
Next week: Revolt begins in Texas, and what really caused the Texas Revolution.
The East Texas Historical Association provides this column as a public service. Scott Sosebee is a Professor of History at Stephen F. Austin State University and the Executive Director of the Association. He can be contacted at sosebeem@sfasu.edu or via www.easttexashistorical.org.