Rumblings and Tension: The Idea of Revolution Percolates in Texas (May 12, 2024)
by Scott Sosebee
This week we continue with the series on the causes and coming of the Texas Revolution. This entry examines an growing rift between Anglos in Texas and Mexican authority and how those Anglos sought to not commit to open rebellion.
When the Mexican Congress issued the Law of April 6, 1830, it became clear to both the Anglos in Texas and the liberal Federalist faction in Mexico what the conservative Centralists hoped to accomplish. They wanted tighter and greater control over the nation as a whole and Texas would be an example of such policy. The new Centralist government moved to reinforce the presidios at San Antonio, Goliad, and Nacogdoches and signaled the intention to build six more such presidios within Texas. The first three of those to begin construction were perhaps the most vital ones as far as the national government was concerned: Tenoxtitlan, roughly at the halfway point on the El Camino Real between Sam Antonio and Nacogdoches and thus a sentinel to control movement between Mexico and the Anglo portions of Texas; another at Velasco at the mouth of the Brazos river, designed to mostly collect the newly passed customs duties enacted by the law; and finally at Anahuac at the head of Galveston Bay near the mouth of the Trinity River, designed for the same purpose.
The state government of Coahuila y Tejas strongly protested the moves and thus the Anglos in Texas more closely aligned themselves with that faction within Mexico. The Anglos, then, were seemingly committing themselves to a political stance with the Federalists, enjoining themselves to the ongoing strife within the larger nation. It is important to note that to a large degree, in the early 1830s, the leaders of the Texas Anglo colonies, people like Stephen F. Austin, Green DeWitt, and José Antonio Navarro who represented Texas in the Coahuila y Tejas legislature, were not advocating or even contemplating rebellion against Mexican authority; the only “rebellion” in their minds was an opposition to Centralist rule.
If the leaders in the early 1830s who favored “working within the Mexican system” constituted what will become known as the “Peace Party,” then the other faction in Texas was a more radical group that would take the moniker of the “War Party.” While this faction would evolve into one favoring separation from Mexico by the mid-1830s, in its earliest days they were the one expressing the most dissatisfaction with the Law og April 6. Their membership also helped to dictate their policy desires. Most of those in this faction were more newly arrived Anglos, the ones who saw items in Mexican law, the restrictions on immigration, the collection of customs duties, and the abrogation of land policies as most detrimental to their aims and desires in moving to Texas. It would be friction between members of this faction and the new Mexican initiatives that would precipitate the first real stand-off between the Anglos and the Mexican government.
The Mexican customs house and garrison at Anahuac was the first of those proposed entities to become operational and in the summer of 1832, it would be the scene of hostility. William Barret Travis, an attorney by trade, but almost a serial “schemer” by avocation, appeared at the Mexican garrison in May 1832. Travis asked for an audience with Juan Bradburn, a Kentucky born soldier of fortune who had joined and fought with the Mexican army, who was the commander in Anahuac. Travis claimed that he represented a Louisiana slave owner who had hired him to find and bring back an escaped slave. Bradburn—following Mexican policy—had not only granted the slave in question asylum but had added him to the roster of the post’s soldiers. Instead of grating Travis’ request, Bradburn arrested him on charges of sedition, which then led a group of Anglos from nearby Liberty as well as from Brazoria—who were also angry that all customs traffic had to be cleared by the port of Brazoria—to march on Anahuac and demand Travis’ release. There was a short and indecisive skirmish, but the lead Mexican commander in Texas, José de las Piedras, the garrison commander in Nacogdoches, relieved Bradburn of command and released Travis. The gathered Anglos then issued the Turtle Bay Resolutions which stated that they were definitely not challenging Mexican sovereignty but just the actions of Bradburn. Further rebelliousness seemed to be averted.
At about the same time that the Anahuac disturbances had flared, deeper within Mexico, popular army general José Antonio de Santa Anna had declared himself a Federalist champion and instigated a coup fight against the Centralist regime. For the Texans in Anahuac and those drafting the Turtle Bay Resolutions, Santa Anna’s attempt to overthrow the Centralist regime represented another way they could distance themselves from rebellion and outright treason. So, they declared that their actions at Anahuac and Velasco was not an action directed toward Mexican sovereignty over Texas, but simply their attempt to support Santa Anna’s fight against the Centralist government. For what it’s worth, the Mexican soldiers at Anahuac also declared for Santa Anna and sailed back to Tampico to join his campaign.
Meanwhile, José de las Piedras—the man who had peacefully thwarted the fight at Anahuac—contemplated the situation in Nacogdoches. In his eyes, the fight at Anahuac may have been a harbinger of what may come in Texas, a province that was dominated by Anglos who had little regard for Mexican authority. Such a scenario was particularly acute in Nacogdoches, a place where Anglos had almost completely overrun the slight Mexican population in that municipality. That led de las Piedras to issue an order when he arrived back in Nacogdoches in July 1832. We must remember that de las Piedras had a much different background than the American émigrés who surrounded him in Nacogdoches, people who brought their American ideas about individual freedom with them. De las Piedras wanted to avoid a confrontation in Nacogdoches such as had taken place in Anahuac, a fight that he thought had occurred because heavily armed frontiersmen believed they had a full right to resist any authority they did not agree with. In his mind, he needed to keep an mob from forcing a regime change through armed conflict, so he issued an order within the Nacogdoches municipality that all residents needed to appear at the Red House—his seat of government—and surrender their arms to the Mexican garrison. You can imagine how this went over among the American residents. The Battle of Nacogdoches was about to implement another wrinkle in the growing fight between Anglos and Mexican authority in Texas.
Next week: The Battle of Nacogdoches ends in an Anglo victory, and spurs another round of attempts to reconcile Anglo action against Mexican authority without admitting rebellion
The East Texas Historical Association provides this column as a public service. Scott Sosebee is a Professor of History at Stephen F. Austin State University and the Executive Director of the Association. He can be contacted at sosebeem@sfasu.edu or via www.easttexashistorical.org.